INTRODUCTION
Administrative agencies-performing quasi-judicial, legislative, and executive functions-serve as a direct link between Indiana's citizens and their government. Because of this connection, agencies present the courts with a range of legal problems touching all corners of Indiana's legal landscape and affecting wide-ranging interests. While courts have developed steadfast principles to address these issues, it is important to review how the courts apply those principles in the context of an evolving administrative state. That is the purpose of this survey Article.
I. ACCESS TO JUDICIAL REVIEW

A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
An individual or entity aggrieved by the actions or inactions of the state must generally exhaust administrative remedies before seeking court intervention. But 1 in some instances, the aggrieved party can circumvent the administrative process. One such instance is when it is futile to seek recourse through that process. Two At the Indiana Court of Appeals, the parties disputed whether Ellis had exhausted his administrative remedies, and thus whether the postconviction court had subject matter jurisdiction. The court first clarified that exhaustion of 11 administrative remedies is a question of procedural error, and that claims based on procedural defects do not implicate subject matter jurisdiction. The court 12 then explained that the DOC must implement grievance procedures that inmates are required to exhaust before they may appeal to the postconviction court. In 13 this case, the appellate court found the postconviction court erred by denying the inmate's petition without considering whether he had exhausted his administrative remedies. On remand, the postconviction court was instructed to 14 consider the exhaustion question and to dismiss the inmate's petition without prejudice if it found failure to exhaust. However, if the postconviction court 15 determined on remand that the inmate did exhaust his remedies, it was instructed to hear the petition on its merits. 16 Though the court of appeals in Ellis had explained that failure to exhaust does not implicate subject matter jurisdiction, the court of appeals reached the opposite conclusion in Bragg v. Kittle's Home Furnishings, Inc. Bragg involved a claim 17 by a furniture sales employee for failure of her employer to pay commissions within the ten-day limit set forth in the Indiana Wage Payment Statute (Indiana Code section 22-2-5-1(b)). The case was brought both on behalf of the 18 employee herself, as well as on behalf of a class of unknown current and former employees paid in a similar fashion. The plaintiff only alleged that the 19 employer's payment of commissions was untimely, conceding that all amounts due were ultimately paid. 20 The trial court dismissed the claims of the unknown purported class members whose employment was involuntarily terminated prior to the complaint ("terminated class members"), finding that these members had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies under the Wage Claims Statute because their claims were not submitted to the Department of Labor ("DOL") prior to filing. The trial 21 court also dismissed, on summary judgment, the claims of the remaining class members and the plaintiff herself, finding the commissions at issue did not On appeal, the employee argued that the claims of the terminated class members were governed by the Wage Payment Statute rather than the Wage Claims Statute. The Indiana Court of Appeals disagreed, finding the 23 determination of which statute applies depends on the employment status of employees at the time their claims are brought. It concluded the Wage Claims 24 Statute applies to any employee whose employment is involuntarily terminated prior to the filing of a complaint, and the Wage Payment Statute applies to other employees. 25 The plaintiff argued, in the alternative, that any failure of the terminated class members to exhaust administrative remedies is excusable on futility grounds because the DOL has no investigative or enforcement apparatus; therefore, its procedures would not have provided any benefit. The court disagreed with her 26 contention that the informal, nonbinding nature of the DOL's claim resolution process offered no benefit to the terminated class members. The court explained 27 that the DOL's dispute resolution procedures are in the nature of mediation, and that the procedures "promote judicial economy by allowing all wage claimants the opportunity to resolve their wage disputes at the administrative level first before engaging in the often time-consuming and expensive process of litigation." The court concluded the trial court properly dismissed the claims of 28 the terminated class members due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction, based on their failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
29
Finally, the court upheld the trial court's dismissal on summary judgment of the claims of the plaintiff and the remaining purported class members, finding the commissions at issue were not "wages" under the Wage Payment Statute, and therefore the statute's ten-day time limit did not apply. 41. Simon, 52 N.E.3d at 67. 42. Id. "A trend is the general direction the market is taking during a specified period of time. Trends can be both upward and downward, relating to bullish and bearish markets, respectively. While there is no specified minimum amount of time required for a direction to be considered a trend, the longer the direction is maintained, the more notable the trend. The Marion County Assessor ("Assessor"), on the other hand, challenged whether the mall's sale was an arm's-length transaction because of the seemingly quick sale, the gradual declination of the mall's value, the faulty calculation of the trending factors in the Coers Analysis, and that the sale price did not reflect value-in-use. The Assessor submitted an income approach that she prepared 45 valuing the mall at $34,600,000 for 2006 and $30,800,000 for 2007. 46 Following the hearing, the Board decided the mall's December 2007 sales price of $18,000,000 was "the best indication of its market value as of that date" There is also a presumption that decisions of a zoning board, "as an administrative agency with expertise in the area of zoning problems [,] " are correct and "should not be overturned unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. A decision is arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion if it is not supported by substantial evidence." This is identical to the court's 84 review of a state agency decision under Indiana's Administrative Orders and Procedures Act. 85 Ultimately, the court ruled against the MacFadyens because they lacked standing: viz. they were not aggrieved by the Commission's decision. The
30
II. SCOPE AND EFFECT OF AGENCY ACTIONS
A. Standard of Review and Deference to Agency Fact-finding Determinations
86
Commission heard evidence that the MacFadyens had access to the rear of their property and the value of the property was not diminished. Because the court 87 cannot reweigh evidence, it affirmed the decision.
88
B. Deference to Administrative Agencies' Interpretation of Statutes They Are Charged with Enforcing
As the MacFadyen case demonstrates, courts review the factual determinations of administrative agencies with deference. Likewise, courts treat would be within a radius of more than six, but less than ten, miles from several other dealers ("Dealers"). The Dealers protested, seeking declaratory judgment 93 from the Auto Dealer Services Division of the Office of the Indiana Secretary of State ("Division") pursuant to a statute that permits dealers to protest the establishment or relocation of a dealership, Indiana Code section 9-32-13-24. The manufacturer of the automobiles at issue filed a motion to dismiss. The 95 manufacturer claimed that the Dealers lacked standing because they were outside the "relevant market area," as defined by Indiana Code section 9-32-2-20, which 96 defines "relevant market area" as follows:
(1) With respect to a new motor vehicle dealer who plans to relocate the dealer's place of business in a county having a population of more than one hundred thousand (100,000), the area within a radius of six (6) determined the "proposed new motor vehicle dealer" language in subsection 20(2)(A) could not be limited to newly created dealerships since another statute, Indiana Code section 9-32-13-24(e), contemplates a proposed dealer's move. 100 The court determined that "a proposed new motor vehicle dealer is simply 'a dealer that proposes to enter a market where that dealer is not already doing business.'" The court further determined that the "in a county" language in 101 sections 20(1) and 20(2)(B) must refer only to dealers making an intra-county move. The court concluded because the Madison Dealer was not making an 102 intra-county move, it fit under subsection 20(2)(A). Transfer was granted.
104
The Indiana Supreme Court first discussed the deference granted to administrative agencies, noting that judicial review of agency action is "intentionally limited" in recognition of the agency expertise in its field. The 105 court affirmed the familiar principle that an agency's interpretation of a statute it is charged with enforcing is entitled to "great weight," and that if the agency's The court then examined the language and legislative intent of the statute, and concluded the statute "reflects a legislative determination that relocating more than six miles away from another dealership in a densely populated area will not have such a negative effect on the market to allow incumbent dealers to stifle competition through the protest procedure." The court explained that "the 107 Statute contemplates three types of market disruptions that yield a specified relevant market area: (1) dealers 'who plan[] to relocate' in large counties, (2)(A) 'proposed' dealers, and (2)(B) dealers 'who plan[] to relocate' in small counties." The protest range for dealers in the first category is six miles, 108 whereas the protest range for the latter two categories results in a ten-mile area.
109
The court then upheld the Division's determination that this case fits squarely into the first category, because the Madison Dealer planned to relocate into a large county.
110
C. Agency Fact-Finding Procedures
Though the fact-finding decisions of agency decisions are treated with deference, agencies must nevertheless undergo proper fact-finding procedures. with the DLGF pursuant to Indiana Code section 6-1.1-18.5-12, which permits civil taxing units to seek relief by stating that the unit will be unable to carry out its governmental functions and by supporting its allegations with reasonably On appeal, the tax court determined the Township had provided documentation establishing the cause of the shortfall and the resulting impairment on the ability of the township and the fire protection territory to fund their operating budgets, thereby satisfying the Township's requirements under Indiana Code section 6-1.1-18.5-12. The tax court found nothing in the statute requires 119 a township to utilize a particular form in presenting its excess levy appeal, and the DLGF had therefore erred in denying the Township's first appeal on this basis.
Union Township v. Department of Local Government Finance illustrates this
120
The court also rejected the DLGF's second argument that the Township had failed to substantiate the alleged error. The court noted the DLGF's contention 121 that it was required to use a previous year's assessment was not on point, and observed that the DLGF has pointed to no evidence which would support a finding that the St. Joseph County Auditor had reduced the assessed valuation.
122
The court pointed out that the DLGF failed to answer the "$40 million question:" whether an "error" existed.
123
In addition, the court found the DLGF's third reason for denying the first appeal-that the Township failed to request relief with the requisite specificity-unpersuasive. The court stated that "it is abundantly clear what 124 relief Union Township seeks: it wants to recoup the $51,992 in property tax revenue it was unable to collect in 2011 as a result of the $40 million discrepancy." Finally, with respect to the rejection of the second appeal, the 125 court observed that the parties disagreed regarding whether the county forms had been provided, but explained it need not determine whether the DLGF erred in denying the Township's appeal for that reason. The court described that both 126 the first and second appeals to the DLGF hinge on whether a $40 million error gave rise to a property tax revenue shortfall, which is a factual question appropriate for the DLGF, not the tax court. that it determine whether an error occurred to cause the $40 million discrepancy. If so, the DLGF was ordered to issue a correction to be applied to 128 the Township's levy limitations, and levy for the ensuing year to offset the cumulative effect caused by the error. The court concluded by stating that "this 129 case demonstrates yet another instance where infirmities in the DLGF's factfinding process have hindered the tax court's review of the final determination and certified administrative record." The court then "strongly encourage At the Board hearing, Blesich presented an appraisal that valued his property more than $20,000 less than the PTABOA assessment, and he also presented a letter documenting the St. John Township Assessor's previous offer to reduce Blesich's assessment. This is where the seemingly benign decision earns its 138 place in this review. Naturally, the Lake County Assessor ("Assessor") objected to the appraisal and the letter, arguing that the appraisal was inadmissible hearsay and that the letter was irrelevant and concerned negotiations to which the Assessor was not a party. The Board issued a final determination, "finding that the Appraisal was admissible hearsay evidence that was 'arguably probative' of the subject property's value" but that it could not be the sole basis for a reduction of 141 Blesich's assessment because the Assessor had properly objected. The Board 142 also found the settlement letter lacked probative value and ultimately decided that Blesich had not made a prima facie case for a reduction. Blesich appealed. 143 144
On appeal, the Indiana Tax Court noted that it will reverse a final judgment of an agency if "it is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; in excess of or short of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations; without observance of the procedure required by law; or unsupported by substantial or reliable evidence." Blesich's main argument on appeal was that 145 the Board erred in disregarding his offered appraisal and the settlement letter.
146
He also complained that the Board failed to hold the administrative hearing in the time prescribed by statute. The court disagreed with Blesich on all counts.
148
First, the court observed that because Blesich elected to litigate the case under the Board's small claims rules-those rules provide that hearsay is admissible-the Board's "final determination cannot be based solely upon hearsay evidence when it is properly objected to and does not fall within a recognized exception to the hearsay rule." Here, the court decided the Board's 149 decision to exclude the appraisal was proper. The Assessor properly objected 150 to the appraisal, and Blesich did not provide the court with an applicable hearsay exception to offering the appraisal without the availability of cross-examining the appraiser. The survey period has produced an unusual number of important and (in some cases) high-profile decisions concerning government transparency. In fact, there is a case currently pending that speaks to this very issue and concerns the Vice President of the United States.
160
The first of these cases is an Indiana Supreme Court decision that addressed separation of powers issues in connection with the Access to Public Records Act ("APRA"), Indiana Code section 5-14-3-1 to 5-14-3-10. was then filed with the Public Access Counselor, who concluded that although the APRA applies to the Indiana General Assembly, the majority of the information requested is exempted from disclosure under the APRA pursuant to the legislative work product exception. A third request was made to 164 Representative Koch and was again denied, this time also on grounds of legislative work product. The Public Access Counselor again determined that 165 the information sought in the third request was exemptible because the "disclosure or denial of the work product is at the discretion of the legislature."
166
The Energy and Policy Institute, joined by Citizens Action Coalition of Indiana and the Common Cause of Indiana ("Plaintiffs"), filed a complaint in trial court against Representative Koch and the Indiana House Republican Caucus ("Defendants"). Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the Plaintiffs' 167 requests should be found non-justiciable because they would "interfere with the internal workings of the legislature." Alternatively, Defendants argued that (1) 168 two of the Plaintiffs lacked standing to sue; (2) neither Representative Koch nor the Republic Caucus is a "public agency" subject to the APRA; and (3) the Caucus was not a proper party because the requests were only made to Representative Koch. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss finding the 169 issue non-justiciable, without reaching the other arguments. The Plaintiffs 170 appealed and sought immediate review by the Indiana Supreme Court, which the Indiana Supreme Court granted.
171
The Indiana Supreme Court first explained the distinction between jurisdiction and justiciability, noting that jurisdiction addresses the power of a court to decide a case or issue a decree, while justiciability addresses whether the issue is appropriate or suitable for adjudication by the court.
The court 172 explained that it has subject matter jurisdiction over the case pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 56(A), which permits the Indiana Supreme Court to accept jurisdiction over a case that would otherwise be at the court of appeals "upon showing that the appeal involves a substantial question of law of great public importance and that an emergency exists requiring a speedy determination."
173
Turning to the issue of justiciability, the court noted that it may determine that an issue over which it has subject matter jurisdiction is nevertheless non-justiciable The court examined the APRA and determined the General Assembly had not created an exemption reserving to the legislative branch the authority to determine whether the APRA would apply to the legislature, and also found that no constitutional provision expressly reserves this right to the legislative branch, either. Accordingly, the court found the question of whether the APRA applies 176 to the legislature to be justiciable. The court then determined that the APRA 177 clearly contemplates application to the General Assembly and its members because the statute contains a specific exemption for the work product of individual General Assembly members and partisan staffs. Accordingly, the 178 court held the APRA does apply to the General Assembly and its members.
179
The court then turned to the question of whether the requested information constitutes "work product" exemptible from disclosure under the APRA. The 180 court noted that "work product" is not defined by rule or statute. The court 181 declined to implement a "court-created" definition of the word, explaining that "to define for the legislature what constitutes its own work product, and to then order the disclosure of such documents, would indeed be an interference with the internal operations of the General Assembly." The court further explained that 182 defining work product "falls squarely within a 'core legislative function'" because only the General Assembly can properly define what work product may be produced while engaging in its legislative duties. The court finally observed 183 that the statute establishing the legislative work product exemption permits the exemption to be exercised "at the discretion of a public agency," thereby expressly reserving to the General Assembly the authority to disclose or not disclose work product. Justice Rucker noted that the majority attempted to circumvent this issue by citing authority for the proposition that the court "may affirm the grant of a motion to dismiss if it is sustainable on any theory." However, Justice Rucker 188 pointed out that the trial court did not grant the motion to dismiss, but simply refused to address the issue on justiciability grounds. As such, he concluded, 189 it cannot be said that the court is affirming the trial court's grant of a motion to dismiss. He also pointed out that the trial court's judgment must be supported 190 by the evidence, noting "affirming the trial court on an alternative theory is appropriate only 'where the parties have addressed themselves to the merits of the theory on which the judgment is ultimately sustained. '" 191 Justice Rucker stated that while the APRA unquestionably exempts from disclosure the work product of the General Assembly, the Defendants did not raise this argument before either the trial court or the Indiana Supreme Court.
192
He also noted that "Defendants never alleged a work product exemption or asserted emails, draft records, notes, minutes, scheduling records, text messages, and all other correspondence or records fall within the exemption umbrella."
193
He concluded, "The majority's ruling is not only premature, but it unfortunately weighs in on a significant separation of powers issue without an adequate record. I would refrain from so doing and instead remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings." Resolution of the University of Notre Dame trustees" and was granted general police powers. The Department also enforces student code and other rules, 198 offers private transportation to students with private needs, escorts students at night, and "coordinates internal disciplinary reviews, and implements safety The request was broad, encompassing all incident reports, whether the student-athlete was "named as a victim, suspect, witness, or reporting party."
200
The Department denied the request, relying on three previous Public Access Counselor ("PAC") advisory opinions "that concluded private university police departments are not 'lawful enforcement agencies' under Indiana's Access to Public Records Act." ESPN filed a formal complaint with the PAC, alleging a 201 violation of the APRA. The PAC deviated from his predecessors, deciding that 202 the Department was a "public law enforcement agency" and thus subject to APRA's disclosure requirements.
In doing so, he reasoned that the court declined to apply the doctrine of legislative acquiescence because the PAC's opinions were not sufficiently long-standing.
217
The Department sought transfer, which the Indiana Supreme Court granted.
218
The court initially observed that the APRA was enacted with the purpose of providing transparency. The court also observed that while APRA should be 219 "liberally construed," that directive applied "in determining what records are subject to disclosure, not who is covered by APRA." It further noted its 220 responsibility to give statutory language its "plain meaning" and "give effect to the intent of the legislature." with the Department's take. 226 The court observed that private educational institutions "have been granted statutory authority to appoint police officers to protect their campuses [,] " that those officers are vested with general police powers, and that they are also "uniquely entrusted to enforce the rules and regulations of their appointing educational institution."
Since the officers take an oath "in the form and 227 manner prescribed by the appointing governing board," the Department acts 228 under the control of the trustees, who are free from government interference.
229
As such, the Department cannot fit the plain language in APRA that the law however, argued that it did not derive its power from the executive but from the trustees. The court took this argument to heart. Because the Department was 234 exercising powers passed to it through the trustees, it was shielded from becoming a public agency despite the fact that the power the trustees were given came from the power of the state. Glossing over this point, the court continued 235 and focused on the ancillary functions the Department performed. "While the 236 trustees permit these officers to perform some traditional police functions, they are also tasked with many University-specific duties, for example, enforcing the student code, escorting students late at night, and acting as student caretakers."
237
Since there was no government control, the court noted, these "mere interconnections between a public and private entity are insufficient."
238
The court then cemented the issue using statutory interpretation principles. 239 Specifically, the court opined that the Department could not be a public agency because to hold otherwise would be to interpret a statute in a way that renders a part of it meaningless or superfluous.
And such an exercise is clearly 240 antithetical to the goal of statutory interpretation to give words their plain meaning.
241
The court added that if it found the Department was a public agency, such a conclusion would lead to two absurd results. First, because the Department is 242 not separate from a private university, holding that the Department is a public agency would necessarily subject private universities to public scrutiny, which is clearly not intended under the law. Second, it would be absurd to count a law (2014) enforcement agency as a public agency because APRA requires disclosure of investigatory records, and those are expressly exempted for law enforcement agencies.
244
The court, therefore, held the Department is not a public agency subject to APRA, and affirmed the decision of the trial court. had not yet adopted a uniform policy on the issues as required by Indiana law. The 250 MCVR claimed that this was not a denial under the APRA, but rather an acknowledgement that a condition must be satisfied before the MCVR could respond more fully. The attorney took the matter to the Indiana Public Access 251
Counselor, who agreed that the MCEB needed to adopt a uniform policy, but advised that this action needed to be taken immediately because the MCEB may not refuse to adopt a policy as a way to avoid responding to an APRA request.
252
After receiving the Public Access Counselor's advisory opinion, the attorney sued in trial court on behalf of other plaintiffs and himself. The trial court 253 found in favor of the plaintiffs and set the matter for hearing on the issue of attorney fees and expenses. The attorney submitted evidence of $975 in actual 254 expenses for deposition transcripts and filing fees, as well as $47,000 for his own attorney fees. The attorney, who had been practicing for over thirty years and 255 had experience in APRA matters, calculated the fees based on his hourly rate of $250. The trial court reduced the attorney's hourly rate as well as his time for 256 work spent benefitting the other plaintiffs, ultimately finding him entitled to approximately $7500 in attorney fees, plus all expenses.
The reasoned that the $7500 compensated the attorney for missed work, other opportunities for employment, and time the attorney could have spent doing other activities.
258
On appeal, the Indiana Court of Appeals explained that the general rule in the United States is that pro se litigants who are lawyers cannot earn attorney fees; independent counsel must be engaged. The court cited to Kay v. Ehrler, a 259 260 U.S. Supreme Court case that explained the word "attorney" assumes an agency relationship. Kay was quoted by the Indiana Supreme Court for the proposition 261 that public policy supports creating an incentive to retain counsel, because ethical considerations may prohibit pro se attorneys from appearing as witnesses and because engaging independent counsel offers litigants the opportunity to evaluate the case through an independent third party. The court distinguished the present 262 case from a case in which an attorney, after successfully defending an allegedly frivolous Fair Debt Collection Protection Act claim by a former client, was awarded attorney fees in a subsequent malicious prosecution case. The court 263 noted that the latter case involved damages allegedly suffered by the victim of a tort. In contrast, in the present case the court found the attorney fees were 259. Id. at 1207 . 260. 499 U.S. 432, 435-36 (1991 ). 261. Bowes, 53 N.E.3d at 1207 . 262. Id. at 1208 (citing Miller v. West Lafayette Cmty. Sch. Corp., 665 N.E.2d 905, 906-07 (Ind. 1996 responded to Warren with a notice outlining the time, place, and procedure for the Board conference, noting that a special meeting would be held following the executive session. The Board also gave public notice of the meeting, which 282 provided that the executive session would begin at 5:00 PM and that a regular session would begin at "7:00 P.M. or immediately following the Executive Session, whichever comes later."
283
The Board conducted the private conference during an executive session at the time and place provided in the public notice. Warren attended with her 284 attorney and a union representative and the Board heard testimony "from nine different witnesses and received twelve exhibits." After the conference, the Board filed for summary judgment on all claims, noting specifically that Warren was estopped from asserting her breach of contract claim because of the court's prior determination (in the unemployment benefits case) that she was terminated for just cause.
The trial court granted the Board's motion, and Warren 295 appealed.
296
On appeal, the court held neither Warren's breach of contract claim nor her defamation claim were collaterally estopped by the decision of the Indiana Department of Workforce Development because that adjudication was "solely concerned with the existence of just cause." Yet the court ultimately ruled for 297 the Board on those claims: because Warren "failed to demonstrate the grant of summary judgment on these claims was otherwise improper" and because she 298 "ma [de] The notice for the meeting did not comply with the requirements of the Open Door Law, and the violation both impaired public access to the meeting and affected the substance of the final action taken at the meeting. The School Board voted to cancel Warren's contract by a 4-0-3 vote, with three members abstaining. Had the meeting been timely held with proper notice, the designated evidence shows Warren would have attended and objected to two of the board members voting, both of whom voted in favor of her termination.
306
Thus, the meeting was "plainly contrary to the purpose of the Open Door Law."
307
The court reversed the trial court's decision on the Open Door Law claim.
308
An ancillary issue arose in this case that warrants some attention. Warren filed a "Motion to Compel Answers to Deposition Questions regarding communications that occurred during the School Board's executive session." 309 The court noted that the Open Door law "permits public agencies to meet in executive session for limited purposes" but that it does not expressly address whether discussions during such sessions are privileged. The court observed 310 that Warren's discovery request "goes to deliberative processes of the School Board and its members [,] v. Provisor, 669 N.E.2d 406, 409 (Ind. 1996 ) (holding there is a "general bar against probing the mental processes involved in administrative decision-makers' deliberations"). [Vol. 50:1115 intrusion into the functions of the other branches of government.'" 312 IV. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS All administrative agencies must comport with traditional due process principles. The following cases are emblematic of how courts address these issues and continue to consistently apply due process principles despite the myriad of scenarios that come through the administrative process.
The Indiana Professional Licensing Agency ("IPLA") filed an administrative complaint before the Indiana Athletic Trainers Board ("Board") against an athletic trainer for engaging in a consensual sexual relationship with a nineteenyear-old high school student in her care. The complaint alleged that the trainer 313 "engaged in a course of lewd or immoral conduct in connection with delivery of services to the public" and that she "engaged in sexual contact with an athlete in her care," thereby violating Indiana Code sections 25-1-9-4(a)(5) and 4(a)(11).
314
Due to embarrassment the trainer felt over the allegations and the fact that the Deputy Attorney General intended to display nude photographs that the trainer exchanged with the student, the trainer chose to send her attorney to appear on her behalf, and to admit the factual allegations but not the sanctions. The Board 315 determined the presence of only the trainer's attorney was insufficient, and issued a Notice of Proposed Default. After a hearing, the Board unanimously found 316 the trainer in default and in violation of Indiana Code sections 25-1-9-4(a)(5) and 4(a)(11), and placed her on indefinite suspension for seven years.
317
The trainer filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, arguing the decision violated her constitutional rights, and she also sought administrative review under the AOPA. The Board and the IPLA moved to dismiss the complaint on the 318 grounds that the agency record was not filed within thirty-two days of the filing of the complaint. After awaiting the decisions in Teaching Our Posterity 319 Success, Inc. v. Indiana Department of Education, 20 N.E.3d 149 (Ind. 2014), and First American Title Insurance Co. v. Robertson, 19 N.E.3d 757 (Ind. 2014) , amended on reh 'g, 27 N.E.3d 768 (Ind. 2015 The court of appeals reversed on due process grounds, without addressing the timing of the filing of the agency record. The court explained that the due 322 process claim required consideration of two factors: whether there was a deprivation of a constitutionally protected property or liberty interest, and if so, a determination of what procedural safeguards are required. The court found 323 the first factor satisfied, explaining that the right of a person to a license for employment is a recognized property interest. The second factor turned on the 324 proper interpretation of the word "party" in Indiana Code section 4-21.5-3-24, the statute governing default or dismissal under the AOPA. The court held the term 325 "party" includes counsel, and the trial court therefore erred in entering its notice of default. To determine whether this error violated due process, the court then 326 examined the three factor due process test:
(1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, along with the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirements would entail.
327
The court found the private interest at stake to be of paramount importance to the trainer, there was no government interest in disregarding the procedures established by the legislature, and the risk of erroneous deprivation was great because she was not entitled to any further process. The court concluded the 328 trainer was denied an opportunity to be heard "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner," the fundamental requirement of due process. The case 329 was remanded with orders to vacate the Board's decision and to provide the trainer with an administrative hearing that comports with the dictates of due process.
330
In re F.S. addressed the issue of whether compelling a parent to permit the Department of Child Services ("DCS") to interview her children based solely on the uncorroborated accusations of an undisclosed informant violates due process. The mother had four children and was living with the father of her two 331 321. Melton, 53 N.E.3d at 1214 . 322. Id. at 1212 , 1220 . 323. Id. at 1215 . 324. Id. at 1216 . 325. Id. at 1216 -17. 326. Id. at 1218 -19. 327. Id. at 1219 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 321 (1976 The second anonymous report to DCS coincided with an anonymous report to the county probation department.
The probation officer, a DCS case 338 manager, and a police officer went to the home together to investigate the allegations. The mother denied entry to DCS but permitted the other two to 339 enter. The probation officer requested a urine sample from the mother at the 340 home, but rejected the sample given on grounds of color and temperature.
341
However, a second sample was taken at the police department and the screen came back clean.
342
The probation officer told the DCS case manager that the home was in good shape, and the DCS case manager stated that she was satisfied there was no evidence of drug use in the home and that the children were safe. Despite this, 343 DCS filed a motion to compel conduct, indicating that to complete an assessment, interviews with both parents and the children were needed. Prior to the hearing 344 on the motion, another anonymous report was submitted to DCS, which alleged that the children were improperly disciplined in addition to the drug allegations. A DCS case manager investigated the home and determined it 345 appropriate and that there was no evidence of domestic violence or drug abuse, though the mother did refuse a drug test.
346
At the hearing, the mother's counsel argued that "some quantum of evidence" was necessary for the children to be ordered to testify over their mother's issued an order allowing DCS to interview the oldest two of the four children, but stayed the order after the mother filed an appeal. Shortly thereafter while the 349 appeal was pending, the mother was arrested after testing positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine.
She signed a consent permitting her 350 children to be interviewed, and the children were adjudicated CHINS after the mother admitted she was unable to care for the children while incarcerated.
351
DCS argued that these subsequent events mooted the mother's appeal.
352
However, the court of appeals heard the case on its merits anyway, finding that the case "involves a matter of constitutional proportions and is of great public interest." The court of appeals discussed both procedural due process (ensuring 353 that a party will be given notice and an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful manner) and substantive due process (protection from laws that infringe upon a fundamental right or liberty interest deeply rooted in our nation's history and from laws that do not bear a substantial relation to permissible state objectives).
354
The court explained that the sanctity of family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition, and therefore the Due Process Clause protects personal choice in family matters. This includes the rights of parents to raise their 355 children without undue interference by the state, though the state has authority to intervene when parents neglect, abuse, or abandon their children.
356
The court of appeals noted that DCS is statutorily required to investigate all reports of child abuse and neglect that it receives, but that the agency is not statutorily required to interview the child in all circumstances. A trial court may 357 issue an order requiring children to be interviewed over the objection of their parents, but only if good cause is shown. To demonstrate good cause, DCS 358 must allege more than merely that it needs to interview the child to complete its assessment; rather, DCS must show "some evidence beyond a report from an undisclosed source that neglect or abuse is occurring." The court determined 359 that in the present case, no such evidence was produced.
360
The court of appeals concluded that the procedure for assessing reports of 
